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Abstract
Given the Palestinian refugees’ precarious legal status in
their host countries, recognition of the Palestinian right of
return is not only legally viable, but also crucial for the es-
tablishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
That racially driven demographic considerations have
been employed up until now to derail binding and directly
applicable laws and practices, as well as keep the refugees
in a state of legal limbo in their host countries, cuts to the
heart of the fundamental injustice currently plaguing the
Middle East. No amount of obfuscating the facts and the
law can tarnish the applicability and relevance of the
right of return, and Palestinian refugees and their advoca-
tes remain in both a strong moral and legal position to
continue to call for the recognition of that right.
Résumé
Considérant la précarité du statut légal des réfugiés pales-
tiniens dans leur pays hôte, la reconnaissance du Droit
au retour des Palestiniens est non seulement légalement
viable mais aussi un facteur essentiel pour qu’une paix
juste et durable soit établie au Moyen Orient. L’usage –
d’inspiration raciste – de facteurs démographiques pour
faire échouer jusqu’à présent les lois et les pratiques exé-
cutoires directement applicables et ainsi maintenir les ré-
fugiés dans un état juridique incertain dans leur pays
hôte, est au cœur de l’injustice fondamentale qui empoi-
sonne la situation au Moyen-Orient. Toutes les tentati-
ves en vue d’obscurcir les faits et la loi n’arriveront
jamais à ternir l’applicabilité et la pertinence du Droit
au retour. Les Palestiniens et leurs défenseurs restent
donc en position forte, aussi bien au plan moral que lé-
gal, pour continuer leur revendication pour la reconnais-
sance de ce Droit.
P
alestinians, like Israelis, want a national existence. On
this both Yasser Arafat and those Palestinians who
oppose Arafat agree. But Palestinians are, in the main,
refugees who long for repatriation – the right of return.
These are fighting words, both between Israelis and Palesti-
nians and, in certain cases, between Palestinian and Palesti-
nian. Accordingly, it is best to begin slowly, to go over again
the situation which has brought us where we are today.
In 1948, as a result of the first Arab-Israeli war, approxi-
mately 750,000 out of an estimated 900,000 Palestinian
Arabs who were then living in the area that now comprises
the state of Israel – which was, in turn, some 77 per cent of
the area of Palestine as established by the 1922 League of
Nation Mandate – were driven from their homes.1 The
remaining 23 per cent of Mandatory Palestine was appor-
tioned between Jordan, which took control of the area now
known as the West Bank, and Egypt, which took control of
the Gaza Strip.2 Of those 750,000 who were displaced,
approximately 360,000 fled to the West Bank, 200,000 went
to the Gaza Strip, 110,000 fled to Lebanon, 100,000 went to
Jordan (the East Bank), and 82,000 went to Syria.3 Smaller
numbers of refugees made their way into Egypt proper.
Those numbers have now grown considerably. There are
currently some 3.97 million refugees from Palestine regis-
tered with the United Nations: 1,679,623 in Jordan, 878,977
in the Gaza Strip, 626,532 in the West Bank, 401,185 in
Syria, and 387,043 in Lebanon, according to the most recent
figures.4 An additional 1.5 million Palestinian refugees are
not registered with the United Nations.5
The official Israeli position is that the Palestinians fled of
their own accord in 1948 and consequently Israel has no
obligation to repatriate them.6 However, “revisionist” his-
torians, both Palestinian and Israeli, have debunked the
theory that the Arab states were responsible for the refugees’
flight.7 Archival research has revealed that the expulsion of
the Palestinians was an explicit goal of leaders of the Yishuv,
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the Jewish community in Palestine – David Ben-Gurion,
Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Rabin.8 The only real scholarly
debate now is whether the ethnic cleansing of that part of
Palestine that became Israel was deliberate or merely the
result of battlefield decisions.9 That the Palestinians were
made refugees as a result of Israeli military action is no
longer really debatable.
To ensure basic levels of care for the Palestinians, the UN
in 1949 created UNRWA, the United Nations Relief Works
Agency for the Palestine Refugees.10 Its task was, and still is,
to “prevent conditions of starvation and distress among
[the refugees] and to further conditions of peace and stabi-
lity,... [C]onstructive measures should be undertaken at an
early date with a view to the termination of international
assistance for relief.”11 To this day, UNRWA operates the
majority of recognized refugee camps, while continuing
to provide essential education, health, relief, and social
services to Palestine refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the
West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.12 Ironically, since the refu-
gees are considered to be “at present receiving [protection
and assistance] from organs or agencies of the United Na-
tions other than the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees,” namely UNWRA, the Palestinians are not sub-
ject to the protections and safeguards of the 1951 Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees.13 While some scholars
and advocates have argued that the Refugee Convention
and Protocol, along with other international agreements
concerning stateless persons, should apply to the Palesti-
nians and that they should receive the protection of
UNHCR, that position has yet to be put into practice.14 The
ostensible reasoning behind this policy choice, one that enjoys
at least some support from the Palestinians themselves, is that
the Palestinian refugees, unlike most refugees around the
world, seek repatriation only and not the option of asylum
in a third country.15 While there are strong arguments in
favour of allowing Palestinians to enjoy the rights and
benefits of these international treaties, most notably the
right to represent themselves (as opposed to being repre-
sented by the Palestine Authority created for them by other
nations) in any negotiations on their final status, it seems
as if the current legal predicament of the Palestinian refu-
gees vis-à-vis the UN will not change in the foreseeable
future.
With respect to the legal status of Palestinian refugees,
each region in which refugees currently reside presents a
different picture. Refugees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
enjoy the same legal rights as do the non-refugee Palesti-
nian population, except that refugees in the West Bank are
eligible for Jordanian passports, but those passports are for
travel purposes only and do not confer Jordanian  citi-
zenship.16 Thus, the holder can be refused entry by Jordan
as by any other country in the world under each nation’s
immigration laws and policies. Refugees in both the West
Bank and Gaza Strip are also eligible for a passport issued
by the Palestinian Authority, but are permitted to travel on
it only if Israel has granted permission, since Israel retained
control over borders under the terms of the Oslo accords.17
West Bank refugees traveling on a Palestinian Authority
passport may also lose the right to Jordanian citizenship
– a policy adopted by Jordan in 1995.18 For everyday
purposes, West Bank and the Gaza Strip refugees hold
identity cards issued by the Palestinian Authority that also
display the number of the holder’s previous Israeli-issued
identity card.
Around 1.68 million refugees reside currently in Jordan,
a figure that represents some 42 per cent of the Palestinian
refugees registered with UNRWA.19 In addition, there
are in Jordan an estimated 800,000 refugees who were
displaced in 1967, when they fled the Israeli army’s advance
on the West Bank.20 Of the total figure, around 293,000 live
in refugee camps, amounting to no more than 17 per cent
of the total Palestinian refugee population of Jordan.21 The
remaining 82 per cent live outside the camps. All Jordanian
refugees whether living in or outside camps enjoy the beneits
of full Jordanian citizenship, including the right to vote.22
However, a recent book by Joseph Massad, a professor of
political science at Columbia University, details, among
other things, the discrimination Palestinians in Jordan suf-
fer, especially in regard to employment in the public sector
and representation in government.23 In addition some
150,000 refugees who made their way to Jordan following
the 1967 war from the Gaza Strip do not enjoy full citi-
zenship in Jordan and cannot vote or hold jobs in the public
sector.24 These Gaza Strip refugees are eligible to travel on
Jordanian passports that are only valid for two years, as
opposed to the standard five years.25 Were the Palestinian
refugees in Jordan covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention
or the 1967 Protocol – which they are not because of their
protection under UNWRA – they would lose their designa-
tion as “refugees” by virtue of accepting citizenship in
Jordan.26 However, the fact that refugees in Jordan become
Jordanian citizens does not terminate their refugee status
under UNRWA regulations.27 As a result they continue to
be entitled to return to the lands from which they were
driven and to receive compensation for their dispossession.
With respect to Syria, out of the 401,000 Palestinian
refugees, around 116,000 currently live in UNRWA-
recognized refugee camps.28 In general, Palestinians enjoy
many of the same rights as Syrian citizens, although they
are not eligible for Syrian citizenship.29 They enjoy equal
rights in labour and employment, where they are allowed
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to work and join trade unions.30 They are allowed to own
more than one business or commercial enterprise.31 They
are also allowed to serve in the Syrian military.32 Palesti-
nians can move freely within Syria and are not limited in
where they can reside within the country.33 Palestinian
refugees can  leave and  re-enter  Syria  on  a  government
issued travel document or laissez-passer.34 By way of con-
trast, the 50,000 or so Palestinian refugees currently resi-
ding in Egypt are not allowed to leave the country without
first obtaining a return visa, which is issued at the discretion
of the Egyptian authorities.35 Palestinians in Syria cannot
own more than one home, however, and cannot purchase
arable land.36 Nor can the refugees in Syria vote in par-
liamentary or presidential elections or run as candidates for
political office.37
In Lebanon the situation of Palestinian refugees is the
most grave. Fifty-six percent of the total of 387,000 Pales-
tinian refugees in Lebanon live in the twelve refugee camps
run and recognized by UNRWA.38 Over 75,000 other refu-
gees  live in  unrecognized camps or temporary shelters,
bringing the total percentage of refugees living in camp-like
dwellings to 75 per cent of the refugee population.39 The
Department of Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees, an office
within the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior, is responsible
for administering the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.40 All
births, deaths, and marriages must be registered with the
Department, which also must approve any changes in resi-
dence.41 The Department decides whether or not to issue
travel documents for the refugees and must approve finan-
cial aid transferred to them from abroad.42 The Department
maintains a profile on each refugee and assesses for the
Ministry the security risk the refugee may pose.43
Palestinians are classified as foreigners in Lebanon and
may not work without a work permit, which is rarely
granted except in a few limited sectors.44 The vast majority
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can only work in
UNRWA, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, NGOs, or
unsteady, low-paying, dangerous, and unregulated work,
primarily in construction and seasonal agriculture.45 Pales-
tinians are excluded from certain professions. To be admit-
ted to the Lebanese Bar or to obtain work in a government
agency, a person must have been a Lebanese citizen for at
least ten years.46 Even with a work permit Palestinian refu-
gees remain ineligible for social service benefits, although
deductions are made for such benefits from their pay.47 Nor
may the Palestinian refugees join trade unions as full-
fledged members or officers.48 Finally, last year the Lebane-
se government  passed a law decreeing that Palestinians
could not own real property.49 In short, Lebanon is in gross
violation of its obligations under both the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination, each of which guarantees the right
of work, the right to form and join trade unions, and the
right to receive social services and benefits on the same
terms as a country’s citizens.50
The legal situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
explains in part why an estimated 80 per cent live in poverty.51
Other factors include the elimination of the Gulf countries
as a source of potential employment, as a result of the PLO’s
siding with Iraq, and, ironically, the PLO’s cessation of
most forms of aid to Jordanian refugees following the si-
gning of the Oslo Accords in September 1993.52 In this
connection, a high-ranking Palestinian Authority Minister
remarked in March 1995 that the Palestinians in Lebanon
should be considered the responsibility of UNRWA, which
has concentrated its aid on the West Bank and Gaza.53 The
rise in poverty has also created a health crisis, as Palestinians
are not allowed access to Lebanese government hospitals
and other health services.54 Official and unofficial hostility
to Palestinians runs high in Lebanon, with one minister
referring to them in 1995 as “human waste.”55
Essentially, the only real, long-term, solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict is to solve the refugee issue. Resettle-
ment in countries bordering Israel, the West Bank, and
Gaza will only see the refugee situation shunted off onto the
host countries, the refugee populations of which naturally
will never settle in knowing that the country that displaced
them  borders their  country  of  resettlement.56 It  is  only
within this context that one can begin to understand the
right of return – that is, the right of the refugees to return
to the areas of their origin which are now within the state
of Israel – a right that has broad support both within the
Arab world and among refugees. Currently, Israel refuses
to allow the Palestinian refugees to return, except within the
narrowly limited confines of family reunification, while at
the same time allowing every person meeting Israel’s defi-
nition of a Jew, regardless of country of birth, to immigrate
and obtain citizenship in Israel based on [the] Law of
Return, passed by the Knesset in 1950.57 The legal basis of
the Palestinian right of return is not in any doubt and
derives from several independent but mutually enforcing
sources of international law.58 Article 11 of UN General
Assembly Resolution 194, ratified on December 11, 1948,
states that:
...the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace
with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest
practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the
property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or
damage to property which, under the principles of international
Host Countries, Legal Status and the Right of Return
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law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or
authorities responsible.59
This resolution has been reaffirmed by the General Assem-
bly every year since its passage.60 The resolution also created
the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, which was di-
rected to “facilitate” implementation of the Palestinian right
of return.61 However, the Conciliation Commission ceased
all efforts to repatriate Palestinian refugees in 1952, stymied
by the conflicting positions of the Arab states and Israel.62
The  former demanded  full repatriation,  while  the  latter
refused any attempts at repatriation in any degree. Never-
theless, GA Resolution 194 remains as valid today as it was
in 1948 and later resolutions reaffirm “the inalienable right
of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property
from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls
for their return.”63 Additionally, it should be noted that
Israel’s admission to the United Nations in GA Resolution
273 of 1949 was conditioned upon its full implementation
of the provisions of Resolution 194.64
The principle of the right of return has been upheld by
none other than former U.S. President Bill Clinton, who
stated on April 5, 1999, in referring to the Kosovar refugees
and a final peace settlement, that: “The refugees belong in
their own homes, in their own land.”65 Clinton added that:
“Our immediate goal is to provide relief; our long-term goal
is to give them their right to return.”66 In another context,
in 1996, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in a
case involving a Greek Cypriot woman who had been dis-
possessed following the 1974 invasion and occupation of
part of Cyprus by the Turkish army – an occupation that
saw 200,000 Greek Cypriots made refugees who are, inci-
dentally, still waiting to return – that she remained the
rightful owner of her property and was entitled to compen-
sation for its use for the period of its occupation.67 A sub-
sequent decision by that same court found that the refusal
to allow the return of any Greek-Cypriot displaced persons
to their homes in northern Cyprus represented a violation
by Turkey of the European Convention on Human Rights.68
Finally, numerous peace accords over the last twenty years,
covering conflicts from Bosnia to Indochina to Guatemala
and El Salvador, have affirmed the property rights of refu-
gees and, of course, their right of return.69
The principle of a right of return for displaced refugees
is also found in international humanitarian law, which
governs the conduct of states during war and occupation.
The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states that “[i]ndi-
vidual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory
of the Occupying power or to that of any other country,
occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their mo-
tive.”70 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states
that “[e]veryone has the right to leave any country, inclu-
ding his own, and return to his own country,” and that
“[n]o one should be arbitrarily deprived of his own proper-
ty.”71
Current Israeli opposition to the right of return is based
not on legal but on demographic and, to be blunt, ethnic
bias. Two arguments are advanced here. First, the claim is
sometimes made that the areas currently comprising the
state of Israel cannot possibly support the influx of large
numbers of Palestinian refugees. A study of the demogra-
phy of Israel shows that 78 per cent of Israelis are living in
14 per cent of Israel and that the bulk of the refugees fled
from the remaining 86 per cent of the land in Israel on
which only 22 per cent of Israelis live.72 Incidentally, the
total number of refugees from Gaza and Lebanon is more
or less equal to the total number of immigrants from the
former Soviet Union who came to Israel starting in the late
1980s to live in the refugees’ homes and/or on their lands
and elsewhere within Israel.73
Some also argue that if the Palestinian refugees are allowed
to return to Israel, then the Jewish nature of the state would
be altered.74 Leaving to one side the paradox that in the
Jewish state of Israel over 20 per cent of its citizens are
non-Jews, demographic concerns are entirely premature at
this stage, given that Israel shows no signs of accepting the
right of return and that the exact number of refugees wan-
ting to  return is  unknown at this time. Regardless, the
nature and universal acceptance of the principle of the right
of return should trump any demographic considerations,
especially those rooted in racial discrimination and nothing
more. In any event, what exempts Israel from being held
accountable under international legal norms and standards
for a refugee population it clearly created? As one study on
this subject has noted, “[t]he United Nations is under no
more of a legal obligation to maintain Zionism in Israel
than it is to maintain apartheid in South Africa.”75 With
respect to the anti-Arab bias behind Israel’s invocation of
an ethnically pure Jewish state, suffice it to note that the
process of encouraging immigration from the former So-
viet Union has resulted in at least 200,000 – and possibly as
many as 400,000 – non-Jews from that region settling in
Israel. 76
Currently, as is now well known, not only Israel but also
the Palestinian Authority are the chief opponents of the
Palestinian right of return. The Oslo Agreements deal only
with the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars
and do not so much as mention General Assembly Resolu-
tion 194.77 Yasser Arafat himself, in a New York Times op-ed
article, called for a settlement of the refugee issue that would
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eliminate Israel’s demographic concerns.78 The former PLO
representative in Jerusalem, Sari Nusseibeh, has called on
Palestinians to give up the right of return in order to see the
goal of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza
realized and has worked out a proposed peace plan with
former Israeli Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon that reflects that
position.79 In September 2002, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz
reported the PLO executive committee member Abu Mazen
had give a speech at a refugee camp in Syria in which he
intimated that the refugees should give up calling for their
right of return.80 The most recent reports have the same Abu
Mazen commenting on a draft peace plan that gives only
“lip service” to the  right of return  and guarantees  that
Israel’s demographic balance will not be upset.81 Further,
news of a draft Palestinian constitution currently in the
works reveals that the language contemplated does not refer
to a mass return of refugees, a position that is likely to meet
with Israel’s favour.82 Not surprisingly, the Israeli govern-
ment and press agree: the total elimination of the Palesti-
nian right of return is non-negotiable.
Given the Palestinian refugees’ precarious legal status in
their  host  countries, it  should  be therefore  clear  that a
recognition of their right of return is not only legally viable,
but also crucial for the establishment of a just and lasting
peace in the Middle East. That racially driven demographic
considerations have been employed up until now to derail
binding and directly applicable laws and practices, as well
as keep the refugees in a state of legal limbo in their host
countries, cuts to the heart of the fundamental injustice
currently plaguing the Middle East. No amount of obfus-
cating the facts and the law can tarnish the applicability and
relevance of the right of return, and Palestinian refugees
and their advocates remain in both a strong moral and legal
position to continue to call for the recognition of that right.
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